

THE DECLINE OF GOLKAR PARTY'S HEGEMONY. GOLKAR'S PERFORMANCE IN FACING THE SIMULTANEOUS REGIONAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH SULAWESI

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Abstract

After the era of decentralization and democratization, Golkar entered the era of direct regional elections. Golkar in its participation in regional elections in South Sulawesi in 2005-2013 was relatively successful in most regions in South Sulawesi. Entering the regional elections simultaneously in 2015 and 2018, Golkar valued a significant reduction of votes. In some regions, Golkar showed poor performance. Ironically, out of eleven regional elections, Golkar only nominated its candidates in six regions and only won in one region. At present Golkar is facing a serious challenge if it wants to maintain its position in South Sulawesi as the largest base in the region. This qualitative research found the weakening factor of Golkar's power in South Sulawesi in the 2015 simultaneous elections. This factor was the existence of elite factionalization that occurred inside Golkar party after the 2014 presidential election which had an impact on the creation of Golkar internal conflicts and factions in simultaneous elections in South Sulawesi.

Keywords: *Factionalism; Golkar; regional elections; South Sulawesi*

INTRODUCTION

The failure of Golkar to win over its candidates in 10 regencies during the 2015 regional elections in South Sulawesi has made Golkar's power be weaker in these regions. One of the most prominent regions showing Golkar's poor performance was Gowa.

TABLE I
Results Of Regional Election
In Gowa In 2015

No .	Candidate Name	Bearer Party	Vote Acquisition
1.	Andi Maddusila– Wahyu Permana	Demokrat , Hanura, PKPI, PKB	97. 437 (26,81 %)
2.	Sjachrir Sjafrudin– Anwar Usman	Golkar	14.192 (3,90 %)
3.	Djamaluddin Maknun – Masjkur	Perseorangan	5.741 (1,58 %)
4.	Tenri Olle YL– Khairil Muin	PPP, Nasdem	94.706 (26,06 %)
5.	Adnan Purichta YL– Abd. Rauf Mallagan ni	Perseorangan	151.373 (41,65 %)

Source: KPUD Kabupaten Gowa

Golkar's vote in regional election in Gowa was the lowest since the implementation of the direct regional elections in 2005. At that time Ichsan Yasin Limpo who was a Golkar candidate won the most votes and succeeded in winning Gowa regional election.

TABLE II
Comparison Of Golkar Candidate
Vote Acquisition In Gowa
Regional Election In 2005-2015

Year of Regional Election	Golkar Candidate Name	Bearer Party	Vote Acquisition
2005	Ichsan Yasin Limpo – Abd. Razak Badjidu	Golkar, PPKD, Demokrat	98.336 (32 %)
2010	Ichsan Yasin Limpo – Abd. Razak Badjidu	Golkar, Hanura, PDK, PPP, PDIP, PBR, Demokrat	184.628 (56,39 %)
2015	Sjachrir Sjafruddin	Golkar	14.192 (3,90 %)

Source: KPUD Kabupaten Gowa

Three direct regional elections in Gowa showed that the 2015 regional election was the first defeat experienced by Golkar candidates with a very sharp decline in votes. In fact, Gowa is one of the largest vote bases in South Sulawesi.

This strength comes from the legacy of institutional hegemony in the form of infrastructure and a very strong organizational network in which a number of Golkar cadres in Gowa occupy many strategic positions in regional legislative and executive positions.

Since the simultaneous elections in 2015, Golkar has experienced sharp reduction of votes in several parts of Indonesia. This decline was related to the national political conditions at that time where there was a dispute over Golkar Party's management in the DPP and the formation of two-party management, namely the management faction of Aburizal Bakri (the result of the Bali National Conference) and the Agung Laksono management faction (the result of the Ancol National Conference). As a result, Golkar cannot nominate candidates in the 2015 regional elections. However, this problem can be resolved after KPU accommodates Golkar's interests by changing KPU's regulations related to the nomination (allowing political parties that are in dispute in the party's internal management to nominate candidates who have got approval from two disputing camps¹ (Ramadhanil, 2016: 63-81)).

However, Golkar's participation in the 2015 regional elections has not been able to save Golkar from defeat in several regions, including in South Sulawesi. In this region, it can be said to

be a Golkar's strongest base in the region. But in the 2015 regional elections, Golkar can only nominate its candidates to six over eleven districts. Ironically, from the six districts, Golkar only won in Soppeng.

The study of the strength of Golkar in South Sulawesi is always interesting, considering that in this region Golkar has always been the winner of the election and the biggest contributor to Golkar's vote in the region. This is due to Golkar's ability to control patronage by utilizing elites in the region. According to Tomsa, Golkar's political forces were formed through strong patronage relations with local nobility and influential nobles. The influential figures include Yasin Limpo's family, the Halid family, the Baramuli family and several other political families that have influenced local politics and business for decades. For example, Yasin Limpo's family, his power in South Sulawesi, was built from his wealth, loyal sympathizers and thugs and almost all of his family members filled strategic positions in Golkar management and Golkar wing organization. (Tomsa, 2007)

The study of the issue of Golkar institutionalization in elections and regional elections was carried out previously. As was the case with Dirk Tomsa (2008) who measured Golkar institutions in the Indonesian party system after Suharto. Tomsa concluded that the success of Golkar persisted after Soeharto because of the different

¹ In this case, the KPU changed Regulation No. 9 of 2015 concerning the Nomination of the Governor and Deputy Governor, Regent and Deputy Regent and Mayor and Deputy Mayor

become KPU Regulation No. 12 of 2015 concerning Amendment to KPU Regulation No. 9 of 2015.

institutional factors that matched Suharto compared to other parties. It is different from the research conducted by Leo Suryadinata (2007) which states that Golkar has been successfully implemented because it has turned into a pluralistic ethnic party. While Hanta Yuda (2011) using the theory of party institutionalization saw the factors that led to the decline of Golkar's vote in the 2009 Legislative Election. In his research findings, Yuda showed that there were factors that led to Golkar's defeat of factionalism in the party, leadership problems and internal communication, the formation of new parties that form the party and the electoral contestation is increasingly competitive and strong. The image of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the Democratic Party.

Golkar and the level of institutionalization in the face of the early years of reform in 1999 until 2014. What provides a gap from this research is that Golkar after Soeharto who created this was the right choice at the time of the 2015 regional elections. Golkar votes were very very popular. in the Regions Here are Golkar in each Election and Election, namely in South Sulawesi, especially in Gowa.

This study will use a theoretical approach introduced by Boucek (2009). The argument built by Boucek is factionalism can reflect a variety of different parties. In addition, it depends on the causes and internal internalization. In this case, it was proposed that the destructive cycle of factionalism could occur. The three main faces of factionalism include: First,

cooperative factionalism in which many factions work together to build and unite the party. Second, competitive factionalization which arises due to disagreement over the receipt of incentives obtained. This competitive factionalization will usually end badly at party fragmentation, but on the other hand, different between factions can also support because of various different things for the party. Third, degenerative factionalization, the condition consisting of divided parties into many factions aimed at perpetuating the patronage relations of each group. It also ended in the destruction of the party. (Boucek, 2009: 470). Referring to Boucek's theory, only competitive and degenerative factionalization leads to party conflict. Therefore, it is one of the most common functions in Golkar internally at the center and in the reform era that made Golkar increasingly reduce every momentum of electoral contestation.

This study will analyze the thesis of Boucek Factionalism regarding the types of factionalization that contribute to the conflict and the division of parties in this reform era. Given that Golkar has a strong organizational infrastructure network in South Sulawesi that has been built since the New Order. However, due to the inability of Golkar to reduce internal conflicts, it has an impact on the weakening of the party's machinery and the decline in votes in the 2015 simultaneous regional election.

METHODS

This research is a descriptive qualitative research about Golkar South

Sulawesi. The type of research conducted is exploratory research. This research is also a case study research, namely Golkar defeat in the 2015 simultaneous local election in South Sulawesi, with a unit of analysis of candidates who are Golkar cadres fighting in the arena of Gowa regent elections in 2015. Data collection techniques used are documentation and in-depth interviews. Documentation studies were carried out regarding the process of nominating candidates in simultaneous elections, data on vote acquisition, KPU/KPUD, as well as the results of previous studies. Interviews were conducted using the parameters of the selection of respondents, namely understanding the problem, mastering the problem, having been directly involved in Golkar management in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi, and being directly involved in the simultaneous election process in the location under study.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1.1. Factionalization And Internal Conflict Of The Golkar DPP After The 2014 Election

After the 2014 general election, Golkar experienced a threat of division in the DPP. The background to the split between Golkar leaders erupted when Aburizal Bakri, who was the coordinating minister for people's welfare during 2005-2009 and was elected as Golkar's general chairman in 2009, will maneuver to get a second term as chairman of Golkar in 2014. Some had served as party chairmen for two periods since 1978. In addition, Bakri was blamed for the election results where Golkar did not get good results in the 2014 presidential and legislative elections. While Bakri's main opponent, Agung Laksono was the party's deputy chairman and coordinating minister for the welfare of the people during 2009-2014 emerged as competitors in an effort to prevent the re-election of Bakri.

December 2014, Golkar Congress was rushed in Bali and decided to win back Bakri as party chairman. But the Congress was boycotted by Laksono and his faction. They held their own party congress on January 2015 in Ancol, where Laksono was elected as interim party chairman. (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2016)

The emergence of two stewardship made Golkar's board and cadres more divided. The political process to obtain the validity of the management of both the Bali National Conference and the Ancol National Conference was initially carried out by Golkar Party Court as stipulated in Law No. 2 of 2011

concerning Political Parties. However, the mechanism of the Party Court has failed in resolving internal conflicts that occurred.

The inability of the mechanism of Golkar Party Court in resolving the internal conflict of Golkar made the two factions agree to hold talks to discuss the validity of the management of Golkar DPP. As a result of the talks, the two factions agreed to form a negotiating team, each of which was represented by five people who were subsequently referred to as Team 10. The Ancol National Conference faction was represented by Andi Mattalatta, Yorris Raweyai, Priyo Budi Santoso, Agun Gunandjar, and Ibnu Munzir. Whereas the Bali National Conference faction was represented by MS Hidayat, Syarif Cicip Soetardjo, Theo L. Sambuaga, Aziz Syamsuddin, and Fredy Latumahina. (Manggalou, 2017: 6)

The formation of Team 10 is part of the commitment of the two conflicting factions to save Golkar from its non-participation in the simultaneous elections in 2015. Prohibition from participating in the elections in connection with the KPU regulations governing candidate registration does not accept the existence of multiple management in the party. However, through Jusuf Kalla's initiative to hold consultations at the leadership of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, the chairman of the House of Representatives faction, the Chair and Chief of the Commission II of the House of Representatives with the Minister of Home Affairs, the Chair of the KPU, and the Chairman of the

Election Supervisory Body who agreed that the KPU could accept the registration of candidates for election candidates from the management Political parties that disagree with the terms have been signed by both parties at odds over one candidate pair. (Hafid, 2018: 97)

The consensus that occurred between the two factions in the conflicting DPP did not save Golkar from the results of the election which was quite disappointing. Golkar Party Secretary General of the National Conference of Ancol, Zainuddin Amali, deplored the existence of an internal Golkar conflict in the DPP. This is because Amali is aware that the consequences of this conflict have left those who have left the party. Even Golkar in the previous 2015 elections had to accept the defeat of their own cadres carried by other parties.

"If from the internal side it is clear from the exhaustion, the conflict has taken too long and caused great damage to the party. Especially after the 2015 simultaneous election results, it was Golkar number 10 in all elections. We lost to PPP even. Actually, Golkar people who won a lot like Rita (Kutai Kartanegara Regent, East Kalimantan), but he advanced as an independent. Golkar's position at number 10 made Golkar fall in electability. That's an internal factor." (Interview with Zainuddin Amali quoted from Hafid, 2018: 98)

1.2. Factions and Internal Conflict in the Election of the Gowa Regent 2015

The triggering of factions and internal conflicts in Golkar Gowa when Golkar Gowa Regional Representative Council has screened the names of candidates who will be recommended to Golkar DPP. The names that have been recommended by Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi were taken to the DPP to be selected and a candidate pair representing Golkar in Gowa regional election was selected. But it seems that the names that have been recommended do not seem to have been approved by Golkar DPP. Instead, the approved candidate pairs were Sjahrir Sjafruddin and Anwar Usman.

What was surprising for Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi was that the candidate pair did not originate from the screening process and the determination of candidates who had carried out the DPD level I and II. Hoist Bachtiar, who is a team of Gowa Regional Coordinator of Golkar Regional Representative Council I at that time mentioned that,

"Indeed at that time I was the regional coordinator for the Gowa region in selecting candidates. And as a result, we recommend two names, Ms. Tenri Olle and Adnan Purichta. However, because I was the team leader, I knew that the sub-district support was to Ibu Tenri and I tried to fight for the name Ibu Tenri, but apparently it was not possible and it was

decided to Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin). "(Interview with Hoist Bachtiar, 10 April 2018)

Even when the author asked how the process of determining Sjafruddin to the Deputy Chairperson of Golkar DPD I, Moh. Roem did not even know Sjafruddin and claimed that Sjafruddin had never served as a Golkar official.

"We are here (the management in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi) do not know anything and suddenly we get the recommendation of the name Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin) who will be nominated by the party as a candidate for the regional election. Even though he never communicated with Golkar's DPD I in South Sulawesi. We did not even know Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin) was a member of Golkar. All we know is that he has run for the legislative candidate in the previous period. (Interview with Moh. Roem, 9 April 2018)

The process of determining prospective candidates by the DPP without regard to the recommendations of the DPD in the region made some Golkar Gowa officials feel disappointed. Like Ridwan Gading, who considers Tenri Olle to be more suitable to be carried by the DPP.

"Indeed, what is unfortunate is that Tenri's mother has twice been a member of the House of Representatives and she is the big (loyal) love of Golkar. Ibu tenri was proposed in the DPD and she followed a temporary process Dg.

Jarung (Sjafruddin) who did not follow the process but instead he got the stretcher (from the DPP). Mrs. Tenri followed all the processes, coincidentally at that time I was a team 7 and went back to the DPD following the process above and reaching Jakarta. I am a genuine cadre in Golkar and I have to be loyal to the party. And feel as a cadre who is together - together with Mrs. Tenri and there is no reason for Golkar not to support Tenri's mother. One mistake for Golkar at that time when not giving support to Tenri's mother. (Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 April 2018)

At that time Ridwan Gading, who took part in the process of determining candidates for the DPP, said that the situation of the meeting determined that the prospective candidates would be closed and only attended by the Pemilukada team and represented by Golkar DPD I South Sulawesi. (Muthalib, 2016: 69) This shows that the process of determining candidates for regional election takes place exclusively, elitistly, and not transparently.

When the author inquired about this determination process to Anwar Usman who is a partner of Sjafruddin, Usman said that the process of determining the time was indeed pragmatic and not in accordance with the party mechanism in determining candidate for regional election.

"The condition at that time was a battle of prestige between Agung Laksono and Aburizal Bakri.

Agung knows that Tenri Olle is the chairman of Golkar Gowa DPD which is the brother of Syahrul Yasin Limpo, the Chairperson of Golkar DPD in South Sulawesi under the management of Aburizal Bakri. So there is an effort from Agung to not give recommendations to cadres who are under the management of Bakri. So when I was in Slipi with Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin), I said that I was a minority in Golkar Gowa and would fight for Agung Laksono's administration in my constituency. Hearing this, Agung felt touched and gave us the recommendation for the investigation to be further fought on in Team 10 of Golkar Party which consisted of each of the stewards of both Agung Laksono and Aburizal Bakri. Because we still will not be officially registered at the Gowa Election Commission if the two sides do not approve our names. ”(Interview with Anwar Usman, April 19, 2018)

Entering the campaign period, Adnan Purichta, who was known to be advancing through individual channels, managed to get support from the management of Aburizal Bakri. It is based on the instructions issued by the management of Aburizal as stated in number R316/Golkar/VIII/2015 dated 8 August 2015 concerning the transfer of support for candidate for regional election in Gowa. Nurdin Halid said, quoted from the local Gowa news, the candidate pair who received a

recommendation from the two Golkar camps in Gowa regional election Sjahrir Sjaruddin Daeng Jarrung-Anwar Usman (Djaman Ta) was no longer a priority for the victory of the Aburizal Golkar DPP. The pair has since been promoted by Golkar's Agung Laksono's management. Nurdin Halid further added that according to the party's instructions, in Gowa regional election it was obliged to win the Adnan Purichta Ichsan Yasin Limpo-Abdul Rauf Kr Kio pair (AdnanKio). So that if there are cadres who are caught not winning this pair, then the party will give strict sanctions. The sanction can be dismissal. (Daily News ANTARA Sulsel, 2015)

Responding to the threats and attitudes of the DPP, the management of Aburizal, the Regional Coordinator of Golkar Winning District. Gowa, Hoist Bachtiar, regretted this attitude because it would only cause new problems in Gowa regional election and would damage the party's authority.

"I don't agree with threats like that. Golkar is currently in a polemic and not complicated by the many threats because the threat of dismissal will cause new problems below (Gowa regional elections) and reap a lot of criticism and damage the authority of the party. If all are fired, cadres will leave this party. Since the beginning, the two camps have agreed to carry out Daeng Jarung and Anwar Usman, and even if the stronghold of Aburizal wants to support Adnan, the stretcher should be withdrawn first. ”(Berita Harian makassar.antaranews, 2015)

The transfer of support carried out by Golkar DPP, made Golkar's internal conflicts inevitable. This then led to factionalization of the elite in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi and Golkar Gowa DPD. Furthermore, factionalism that occurred affected the winning process of the three candidates namely Sjafruddin, Tenri Olle and Adnan Purichta.

The most disadvantaged candidates for the factionalization of the elite that occurred was Sjafruddin. The Deputy Secretary of the DPD Golkar Gowa said that at first Sjafruddin had no support for Golkar infrastructure in the region because Golkar Gowa management decree was issued at the same time as Sjafruddin's gathering.

"In the course of nomination Dg. Jarung (Sjafruddin) there is no Golkar structure that strongly supports Dg. Jarung (Sjafruddin) because Golkar structure at that time was not yet ripe because almost simultaneously we were formed with the promotion. So we have not been able to form sub-district leaders, have not been able to form administrators and have not consolidated to form village leaders and sub-district leaders so that there is very little that can support, Golkar people also feel irresponsible. Golkar people are in a new structure with an old structure. People who are in the old structure also have no parent, the old structure people also fight for Ibu Tenri and not for Golkar. Because if fighting for Golkar

means fighting for Dg. Jarung (Sjafruddin). So our party organization does not support Adnan, nor does Ibu Tenri. But we also cannot move because our infrastructure does not allow that where we do not have sub-district administrators, villages etc. So the only reason we support Dg. Jarung (Sjafruddin) is due to the SK from the center. (Interview with Kamaluddin Ahmad, April 9, 2018)

Golkar elite's factionalism in Gowa has shifted to Tenri Olle more because of the form of disappointment towards the elite in the provincial DPD and Golkar DPP. They felt that the recommendation from the two stewards of the Golkar DPP was the result of a political contract and an elite conspiracy from Ichsan Yasin Limpo as an attempt to win his son Adnan Purichta as Gowa Regent. Because if at that time Adnan Purichta was promoted, then the internal conditions in the DPD II of Gowa would be turbulent because of strong opposition from the DPD II officials who were loyal to the leadership of Tenri Olle as chair of DPD II for ten years. On the other hand, if Tenri Olle is carried by Golkar, it will increase Tenri Olle's chances of winning. The vice chairman of the DPD Golkar Gowa also acknowledged that the scenario behind Aburizal Bakri's recommendation to Sjafruddin was Ichsan Yasin Limpo to prevent Tenri Olle from getting a stretch from Golkar.

"The one who transferred Aburizal Bakri's support to Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin) was Mr. Ichsan Yasin

Limpo to prevent Ms. Tenri from getting support from Golkar. Because Golkar members and administrators in the region as much as 90% support Ibu Tenri. (Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 April 2018)

The conflict that took place inside Golkar during the 2015 Gowa regional elections encouraged the formation of new factions in Golkar administration in the region, including in Golkar Gowa DPD. The emergence of the division of Golkar management and cadres in Gowa has an impact on the performance of the electoral disrupted and the trustees and cadres of the elites in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi and Golkar DPP do not adhere to the party's decision.

The disobedience of Golkar cadres and administrators in the regions to the party's decision made them maneuver to support other candidates from other parties. This attitude was carried out by Andi Ishak (Deputy Chairperson of Golkar Gowa), Ridwan Gading (Secretary of the DPD II Golkar Gowa), and Akbar Danu Indarta (Golkar legislator Gowa DPRD). Golkar Gowa management and cadres feel disappointed with the attitude of Golkar DPP in supporting Adnan Purichta and not Tenri Olle who is the chairman of Golkar Gowa for 10 years.

As a result of the disobedience of Golkar Gowa management and cadres to party decisions. The DPP dismissed Andi Ishak and Ridwan Gading for being proven to support Tenri Olle in Gowa regional election. According to Tenri Olle, the decision to dismiss Ishak and

Ridwan was signed by General Chairman of Golkar DPP Aburizal Bakri and Secretary General Idrus Marham. Not only that, but Ishak was also threatened to be replaced through an interim period (PAW) in the Gowa DPRD. The Gowa DPRD has also received a decree of dismissal and a proposal for the replacement of Ishak, who served as Chairperson of the Gowa DPRD Golkar Faction.

The second dismissal of Golkar Gowa officials based on threats will provide strict sanctions for Golkar's board and cadres. This was conveyed by Nurdin Halid when announcing Golkar's stewardship of Aburizal Bakri to support Adnan Purichta in Gowa regional election.

For Golkar administrators and cadres in Gowa, threats to cadres were common during the elections. Ridwan Gading claimed that Golkar always threatened members to follow the party's decision to support Golkar candidates in the elections. But at the time of Gowa regional election, because there were two stewardships in Golkar so Ridwan assumed that the threat was only blamed from the DPP.

"Every party election always assumes members but after the Pilkada is finished it usually just blows. After all, at that time Golkar had no power to act on cadres because it was not clear who was official on the other hand who had a decree of *menkumham* on the other hand there were official ones also recognized by the court. Golkar's condition at that time was in an abnormal condition.

So there were a lot of threats, and I was one of the people who was fired with Mr. Andi Ishak because I was supporting Ibu Tenri and when I was in Jakarta it turned out that the dismissal was fake. (Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 April 2018)

As a result of rumors of the dismissal of two Golkar Gowa officials from the DPP, Tenri Olle felt disappointed with Golkar DPP and finally to decide to leave Golkar and join the Nasdem Party. Tenri Olle's move to the Nasdem Party made more and more Golkar Gowa administrators and cadres disappointed with Golkar DPP and resulted in an increasingly insecure board in the elections.

The weakness of Golkar Gowa winning machine in the elections can be seen during the 2018 gubernatorial election. At that time the Gowaar Gowa campaign machine was not solid in supporting Golkar candidates and became one of the factors of Golkar's defeat in the gubernatorial election.

As a result of Golkar's defeat in the 2018 South Sulawesi gubernatorial election, South Sulawesi Golkar DPD made a change of time (PAW) 8 members of the Gowa DPRD from 9 seats owned by Golkar faction in the Gowa DPRD. This replacement was done because the eight DPRD members were proven not to support Golkar gubernatorial candidates. In addition, they have been confirmed to nominate themselves as members of the Gowa DPRD in the 2019 legislative elections from other parties. (Tribun Gowa, 2018)

The exit of several Golkar Gowa administrators and cadres and moving to another party made Golkar infrastructure network in Gowa weakened. The issue of elite factionalization that occurred since the 2015 Gowa regional elections had a negative impact on Golkar. This is relevant to what Boucek explained about the negative impact of factionalization. Boucek explained that party divisions tend to occur more frequently. The face of competitive factionalism tends to be transformed into degenerative factionalization which results in the decline of the party, and even encourages divisions that create new parties. Furthermore, this will have a direct impact on the growing non-institutionalization of the party system in Indonesia. (Boucek, 2009: 477)

The existence of a prolonged internal conflict in Golkar makes the cadres and administrators in the regions not well organized and reduces the solidity of the party in the General Election and Pilkada. Budiatri (2017) clearly illustrates that other impacts of internal party conflict are disruption of party recruitment and regeneration. When internal conflicts occur, the division of party structures also occurs not only at the national management level and even to the regions. The party will increasingly lose control in the recruitment and regeneration process, even the party will be encouraged to dismiss cadres and change time (PAW) for its politicians in the parliament when they are deemed to disobey party decisions. The division of the management structure to the lower level also provides difficulties for parties

when conducting political recruitment, especially when the regional election will be held. (Budiatri, 2017: 272)

The process of political recruitment and regeneration in parties is an important element that determines the level of institutionalization of a party. With the democratic system taking place in Indonesia, political parties are an important instrument for the continuation of a substantial democratization process. However, internal party conflicts indicate a decline in the party system and the democratic process in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Golkar's inability to reduce internal conflicts and prevent the breakdown of internal party solidity has made Golkar suffer losses even in the region where Golkar has the strongest vote base. The conflict that took place inside Golkar during the 2015 Gowa regional elections encouraged the formation of new factions in Golkar administration in the region, including in Golkar Gowa DPD. The emergence of the division of Golkar management and cadres in Gowa has an impact on the performance of the electoral disrupted and the trustees and cadres of the elites in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi and Golkar DPP do not adhere to the party's decision.

The disobedience of Golkar cadres and administrators in the regions to the party's decision made them maneuver to support other candidates from other parties. This attitude was carried out by Andi Ishak (Deputy Chairperson of Golkar Gowa), Ridwan Gading

(Secretary of the DPD II Golkar Gowa), and Akbar Danu Indarta (Golkar legislator Gowa DPRD). Golkar Gowa management and cadres feel disappointed with the attitude of Golkar DPP in supporting Adnan Purichta and not Tenri Olle who is the chairman of Golkar Gowa for 10 years.

Golkar is actually still the party with the best infrastructure when compared to other parties. But some local politicians apparently no longer regard Golkar as the best vehicle for power aspirations for elites in South Sulawesi. As a result, before the election, many local officials turned away from Golkar and defected to other parties. This change then gives other parties the opportunity to recruit candidates who have popularity in the community. Although the joining of other Golkar party elites is a natural thing as a consequence of the multi-party system and proportional electoral system. However, this shows the inability of Golkar Party to deal with existing developments. The lack of accommodation of elite interests and the frequent occurrence of internal conflicts and factionalizing the elites within the party are factors that cause the release of several party members. This then shows that the weakness of cadre ties with the vision, mission and ideology of the party. In conclusion, it can be concluded that the existence of local elites and traditional rulers in Golkar Party is only reversed by efforts to gain formal power using the party mechanism as a political vehicle in the momentum of electoral contestation in the region.

The emergence of factions in Golkar is not based on differences in ideology or more substantial political flow, but rather because of differences in practical-pragmatic interests. Because of that, the factions in Golkar are actually not permanent, the faction's power map can change in every political moment and event in the party.

Strengthening elite factionalism within Golkar has proven to threaten party solidarity so that it is always vulnerable to divisions in facing every election. Because factionalism at the elite level also affects the pattern of recruitment and cadre flow below and further affects the level of party cadre and loyalty. This condition is certainly detrimental to the party and further weakens Golkar's electoral performance and strength. This reality of factionalism in Golkar also strengthens the Boucek faction's theory which views the face of factionalism as degenerative factionalism, namely the condition when the party is divided into many factions which are intended to perpetuate patronage relations of each group. So it ended in the destruction of the party.

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